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[Excerpt] After the organization of the UAW, it could plausibly be argued that the union turned the game 
around. Indeed, by the late 1950s, the UAW could play one corporation off against another, setting as a 
strike target a single company while permitting the others to encroach on the market share and profits of 
the struck company. The strategy worked, and wages and benefits improved steadily. 
What changed in the 1970s was the global context. With the unrestricted flow of foreign imports into the 
country and the ability of domestic manufacturers to move production or parts supply offshore, the 
number of blue-card corporations in the auto game increased to include European and Japanese 
producers. But, more importantly, the number of white-card workers exploded by several million. European 
and Japanese autoworkers—and later South Korean and Mexican—entered the game but not as members 
of the UAW. The balance of power between blue and white cardholders shifted back toward the blues. 
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Goodbye to the 
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" Barry Bluestone 
Labor's predicament in the 1990s is graphically illustrated in a 
simple exercise that I have incorporated in the Boston week of 
the UAW-GM Paid Education Leave (PEL) program. The 30 or so 
participants in the seminar are given six chances to win the state's 
million-dollar lottery. Each participant is given a blank index card; 
six of these are blue, the remaining 25 or so are white. 
To get one of the six lottery tickets requires that a participant 
find a partner who has a card of the other color, negotiate an agree-
ment on how the million-dollar prize will be divided, and present 
the pair of white and blue cards to the seminar leader. A white 
card without a blue is worthless, as is a blue card without a white. 
The question I ask the seminar participants is: "What is a white 
card worth in this game? One half of the million-dollar jackpot? 
One twenty-fifth?" It turns out that if the game is played in a 
purely competitive manner, the answer is one cent! Since white 
cards and blue cards by themselves get no reward, it is in no one's 
interest to be left without a partner. But with more white cards 
than blue, blue cardholders are free to auction off their cards to 
the six highest bidders. Not to be frozen out of the game, two or 
more white cardholders will often bid frenetically against each 
other until one concedes everything but one cent in order to make 
a deal. 
What makes this particular game so intriguing is that its outcome 
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can be turned on its head. If the white cardholders organize 
themselves into a union so that all of the white cards are played 
as one, the "price" of the now more numerous blue cards plum-
mets and the white cards gain complete control of the game. A 
mere six white-card defectors, however, can nullify the collective 
effort of the "union." 
For the auto industry, this eloquent little exercise reflects more 
than 50 years of labor-management history. Before 1937 and the 
organizing successes in the industry, there were millions of white-
card workers and a handful of blue-card corporations. The results 
were predictable. 
After the organization of the UAW, it could plausibly be argued 
that the union turned the game around. Indeed, by the late 1950s, 
the UAW could play one corporation off against another, setting 
as a strike target a single company while permitting the others 
to encroach on the market share and profits of the struck company. 
The strategy worked, and wages and benefits improved steadily. 
What changed in the 1970s was the global context. With the 
unrestricted flow of foreign imports into the country and the 
ability of domestic manufacturers to move production or parts 
supply offshore, the number of blue-card corporations in the auto 
game increased to include European and Japanese producers. But, 
more importantly, the number of white-card workers exploded by 
several million. European and Japanese autoworkers—and later 
South Korean and Mexican—entered the game but not as members 
of the UAW. The balance of power between blue and white card-
holders shifted back toward the blues. 
Meeting the Challenge of Global Competition 
In response to the worldwide proliferation of white cards, it is 
no great revelation that organized labor must develop a new 
strategy to ensure the job security and the wages and benefits of 
their members. Indeed, we can count four strategic possibilities. 
The preferred solution to this problem is a time-honored o n e -
organize the unorganized. Collecting all of the white cardholders 
into one coordinated international global union could redress the 
balance between management and labor. Unfortunately, there are 
enormous hurdles preventing achievement of this objective. If 
anything, in the auto industry the opposite is occurring. When 
the Canadian autoworkers seceded from the UAW, North 
American solidarity was compromised. Nationalist sentiment will 
make it difficult for the European trade unions to form strong 
alliances following economic unification in 1992. The thought that 
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American unions could form a strong working confederation with 
European, Japanese, South Korean, and Mexican unions for the 
purpose of collective bargaining is perhaps even more far-fetched 
at the moment. Global unionization is a fine idea as was the I.WW. 
of the late 19th Century. But it is an idea whose time is still to 
come. 
A second strategy is to return to the militant adversarial position 
of an earlier era. It could be argued that the new "lean and mean" 
tactics of the corporation aimed at restoring profits to the extra-
ordinary levels that existed before the onslaught of global compe-
tition have not been met by organized resistance. According to 
those who support a staunch defense of existing work rules and 
job classifications, any concession to management's attempt at 
bolstering "flexibility" in the production process can only result 
in the wholesale abandonment of workers' rights and the ultimate 
plundering of the union. In the extreme, management's ability to 
manipulate "cooperative" programs aimed at enhancing produc-
tivity or product quality is said by some to be so great that unions 
must oppose them. 
While there is some nostalgic appeal to "old style" adversarial 
unionism, the lesson of the cards seems compelling. The union, 
no matter how militant its stance, has little power to tame the 
global marketplace or for that matter reign in the multinational 
firm that moves its operations abroad or outsources its production 
to avoid the union. While there has always been some motivation 
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for firms to attempt to avoid organized labor, the fiscal exigencies 
of modern global competition generate stronger incentives than 
ever to pursue union-avoidance tactics. Wage and benefit differ-
entials that are not offset by higher productivity or better product 
quality become the prime target of managers who see themselves 
as constantly battling lower unit-cost, higher-quality producers in 
order to maintain their profit margins, satisfy their stockholders, 
and fend off unfriendly corporate raiders. Confronting manage-
ment with an immutable stance on past union-management 
practices forces the stakes higher and higher. If this is the only 
game in town, it may be necessary to play. But it is a high risk 
strategy with increasingly remote chances of success. In any case, 
the role of good union leadership is to protect the rights and 
welfare of workers and make certain that management cannot take 
undue advantage of the employee within the participation process. 
There is a hidden and powerful assumption in the old style 
adversarial union strategy: management is responsible for success 
in the marketplace while organized labor is responsible for 
obtaining as much of the fruits of that success for its members 
as possible. As long as management faced minimal competition 
and market success was assured, the strategy was reasonable 
enough. In the current era, however, one thing is certain. While 
the fruit may or may not be as plentiful as it once was, manage-
ment does not control anywhere near all the expertise necessary 
to harvest it. Labor has been on the defensive not so much because 
it has been less militant than because management has been less 
successful in its pursuit of markets. That GM's share of U.S. auto 
sales has plummeted from nearly 60% in the 1950s to no more 
than 35% in the late 1980s is more responsible for the present 
plight of autoworkers than anything the UAW may or may not have 
done. 
The weakness of American industry in global competition 
suggests a third strategy for labor. Following Banks and Metzgar 
in this volume, we might call this "Maggie's Strategy." Labor has 
a role to play in boosting shopfloor productivity and product 
quality, but it is incumbent that it do everything to keep its own 
expertise out of the hands of management. This strategy recognizes 
the limits of management to run their enterprises effectively and 
acknowledges the role that organized labor can play in assuring 
job security by boosting productivity and product quality. But in 
order to protect labor from having its skill coopted by manage-
ment and used against the workforce and the union, Maggie's 
strategy attempts to bar management from learning the "tricks" 
of the trade. 
70 Labor Research Review #14 
There are, however, two problems with Maggie's strategy. The 
first is the practical side of keeping production secrets from 
shopfloor managers. Maggie may have been able to hide her 
"trick" from her line supervisor and she may even have been able 
to limit knowledge of the trick to the most loyal workers in the 
union hall. Yet most "tricks" of the trade cannot be kept secret 
because they are obvious. Few can be hidden by fancy handwork; 
the number of Harry Houdinis in the workplace is limited. 
But there is a much more important reason why Maggie's effort 
cannot be generalized as the basis for a new relationship between 
labor and management. Most of the corporate inability to compete 
does not flow from plant floor practices, but from the myriad of 
decisions that management makes unilaterally concerning the 
design, the engineering, and the pricing of the product, the type 
of technology used in production, and the reinvestment strategies 
of the enterprise. As Banks and Metzgar acknowledge, labor must 
begin to participate in all of these areas once reserved to manage-
ment, because it is precisely here where job security and wage 
standards and benefits are won or lost. The most militant union 
in the world cannot win job rights or wages from a company which 
is being run into the ground by inept or myopic management. 
This leads to a fourth strategy, one which is revolutionary in 
content but evolutionary in practice. Workers, through elected 
union representatives, must fully participate in virtually all of the 
decisions that are currently the contractual prerogative of manage-
ment. Essentially, the management prerogatives clause in the 
standard union agreement must be abolished. 
In one sense, this is not revolutionary at all. Labor's historic 
struggle has been to limit managerial discretion over more and 
more of the decisions that affect the lives of union members. 
Progressively, union recognition, wage setting, work rules, job 
classifications, health and safety regulations, and disciplinary 
procedures have all become matters of joint union-management 
agreement. New forms of joint participation call for extending this 
list to a whole range of issues traditionally reserved to those who 
wear white collars and three-piece suits. 
The pattern for this type of new social contract between labor 
and management may be evolving at Saturn, the joint UAW-GM 
attempt to build a brand new automobile in a newly constructed 
facility in Tennessee. Union representatives have been intimately 
involved in the design of the vehicle, in decisions over the 
technology used to produce it, and even in choosing the advertising 
agency that will hawk it to the public. This experiment bears close 
scrutiny. 
Participating in Management 71 
Toward a Revolutionary Union-Management Contract 
Toward the end of my seminar in the UAW-GM PEL program, I 
have taken to proposing a radical set of contract demands, some 
variant of which I hope the UAW might consider presenting to 
GM in the 1990 negotiations. When I first put them forward, I 
did so with some trepidation. The response has been so 
enthusiastic—from both local union leaders and local plant 
management personnel—that I now think of this as one of the high 
points of the PEL experience. Here are the six "demands" I 
propose: 
1) The UAW agrees to target as a mutual goal with the corpora-
tion a 6% productivity improvement in each of the three years 
of the contract. 
2) The UAW demands annual 3% wage boosts plus standard cost-
of-living protection in line with the wage settlements in the 
1984 and 1987 contracts. 
3) The UAW demands that GM reduce the prices of its new cars 
by approximately 1-3% each year, after appropriately 
accounting for the difference between labor productivity 
increases and overall increases in total labor plus non-labor 
costs. 
4) The UAW demands that quality of the product be a strikable 
issue. If the quality coming off the assembly line does not 
meet joint union-management standards, the union has the 
right to close down the line. 
5) The UAW demands an ironclad no layoff clause. Any 
necessary reductions in force must be accomplished through 
normal attrition and jointly negotiated incentives for early 
retirement. 
6) Finally, and most critically, the UAW demands that all cor-
porate decisions regarding matters such as those including 
product pricing, marketing and advertising, methods of 
production, the introduction of new technology, investments 
in new capital and products, and the subcontracting of 
production be the subject of joint action by the union and 
the company. This requires a drastic overhaul of the manage-
ment rights clause. 
Why is there a need for these particular provisions? One reason 
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is simply dignity. As stakeholders in the corporation, workers 
should have a right to help make those decisions that most affect 
their well-being. This is the essence of the struggle for economic 
democracy. 
Beyond this moral requirement, however, are the exigencies of 
good business practice. To regain some of its lost market share, 
GM must stabilize its prices in order to simply get customers into 
dealer showrooms. Hence the call for productivity increases and 
price cuts. To get those new shoppers to actually buy the GM 
product, they must be convinced of its quality. Hence the demand 
for quality as a strikable issue. And to make sure that the produc-
tivity and quality are there in the first place, workers must be 
assured a meaningful role in corporate decision-making and must 
be warranted against losing their jobs in the process. 
To be sure, such a significant increase in union influence over 
corporate decision-making will require a tremendous expansion 
in the skills and expertise of union representatives. But this is as 
it should be. The critical decisions that affected workers' well-
being in the first two-and-a-half decades of the post-World War 
II period were made in the negotiation of the contract and the 
processing of grievances. In today's global economy, the critical 
decisions go far beyond this set of issues to the very areas that 
too often remain solely in the domain of management prerogatives. 
The ultimate goal of the modern union in a global economy is not 
simply to limit the management rights clause, but eventually to 
relegate it to the history books. • 
